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INTRODUCTION 
There are many studies in which researchers have tried to apply cooperative game 
solutions to common cost allocation. Many of these studies focus on Shapley value I) and 
only a few researches discuss nucleolus in common cost allocation. The latter studies 
compare the properties of nucleolus allocation with Shapley value and other allocation 
schemes, so they do not examine the properties of nucleolus itself in common cost 
allocation.2) 
It is well-known that the nucleolus is a subset of the kernel and the kernel is a subset of 
the bargaining set. This property is a basic one that specifies these three cooperative game 
solutions. We should investigate the meaning of this property to examine the properties of 
the nucleolus in common cost allocation. If we can interpret the nucleolus in the bargaining 
processes for allocating common cost meaningfully, the nucleolus will be a useful 
allocation scheme in the case where common cost is allocated through the bargaining of the 
service users. 
In Section 1, we describe the model that we will use in this article. This model is proposed 
in Aoki[ 1997] and specifies the case where we can formulate common cost allocation as a 
characteristic function form game. We develop our discussions in this article based on this 
model. 
We define the cooperative game solutions that are used in the later analysis of this paper 
in Section 2. These solutions are the core, the bargaining set, the kernel, and the nucleolus. 
We define these cooperative game solutions along the definitions in game theory as much 
as possible to interpret the meanings of these solutions correctly in common cost allocation. 
The game specified in Section 1 is a convex game. 3 ) A convex game has interesting 
properties and these properties are useful in our analysis. We explain the properties of 
cooperative game solutions in the convex game in Section 3. 
We propose numerical examples that describe the common cost allocation in Section 
1 ) Shapley value is a cooperative game solution proposed in Shapley[ 19531· 
2) Aoki[19961 surveys the past studies that applied cooperative game solutions to common cost 
allocation and describes the applicability of the nucleolus to common cost allocation. 
3) See Aoki[ 1997]. We define the convex game in Section 1. 
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4. Using these examples, we will give the nucleolus some meaningful interpretations in the 
bargaining processes for allocating common cost. We summarize the contents of this article 
and denote the conclusions of this article in the last section. We will mention the topics that 
we have to solve in the future study of the nucleolus allocation. 
1. Model and Definitions 
Aoki[ 1997] examines the characteristic function in common cost allocation. It specifies the 
situations where we can estimate characteristic functions from the cost information about 
the common service. We can apply the characteristic function form game to common cost 
allocation properly in this model. 
The purpose of this article is to examine the nucleolus as a common cost allocation scheme 
in terms of the bargaining process. So we proceed our analysis based on the model in 
Aoki[ 1997]. We explain the essential points of the model in Aoki[ 1997] here. 
Consider the situations where there are some divisions or departments in a firm and they 
utilize the common services. Common cost is the cost for acquiring the service jointly.4) 
The objective of common cost allocation game is to allocate common cost with a 
satisfactory manner to divisions or departments. 5) 
N is the set of the players. We call N a grand coalition. As the players are rational decision 
makers, the game players in common cost allocation are the managers of divisions or 
departments in a firm. It is assumed implicitly that every player prefers to lower allocated 
cost in the bargaining process for allocating commoncost. The subset of N is referred to as a 
coalition. It is supposed that coalitions can make decisions regarding the acquisition and 
utilization of the service.6) For example, players can decide whether they get the necessary 
service internally or externally. It is assumed that a coalition makes its decision as if it were 
one player. 7) 
q is the demand of the service, so qi is the player i's demand of the service. C(q) is the cost 
function of the service. When C(q) is a concave function, we can estimate the characteristic 
function as the maximin value of the benefit arising from the joint acquisition of the 
service. 8) The cost function C(q) includes the information about the cost of the external the 
4) See Aoki[ 1997] as to the definition of common cost. 
5) This idea leads to "mutually satisfactory allocation" in Thomas[ 1971l. 
6) See Aoki[1997](p.75). 
7) This assumption is necessary when a characteristic function is estimated. See Aoki[ 1997](p.4) as to 
the mplications of this assumption. 
8) Aoki[ 1997] examines the relationship between the cost function and the characteristic function. When 
a cost function is convex, it is necessary to assume another function similar to the characteristic 
function. Although it is not impossible to estimate a characteristic function, this procedure is 
complicated and troublesome. 
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external service when there are some external vendors providing the necessary service in 
the market.9) 
A characteristic function is a mapping 21l-dimensional space into real number R. The value 
of the characteristic function v(S) is the worth that a coalition Scan receive. 10) It is rational 
to assume that the assumption of transferable utilities is satisfied in common cost 
allocation. II) It is convenient to define the characteristic function as the cost saving game in 
common cost allocation. 12) We will proceed our analysis with the following characteristic 
function. 
v(fl) = 0 
v(S) = L C(qi) - C( L q) VSCN (0 
iES iES 
Let sU (v)( C Rll) be an arbitrary cooperative game solution and sUi( v) be player i 's value of 
the game, namely, the allocated amount of benefit to player i. We may represent sUi (v) as Xi 
for abbreviation. As the characteristic function in (0 is O-normalized, v( Ii })=O( ViE N). 
Let ai be the allocated cost to player i. We can represent the relationship between ai and 
sUi (v). 
(2) 
(2) says that the allocated cost to player i (a) is automatically determined if we get the 
value of the game (sU/v)). We will often refer to the value of the game in the successive 
analysis. It should be noted that specifying sUi( v) is equivalent to specifying ai. We will 
abbreviate summation as follows. 
q(S) = L qi 
iES 
VSCN (3) 
When the cost function is a concave function, the characteristic function defined in (1) 
becomes a convex game. l3 ) A convex game is a class of game proposed byShapley[1971]. 
The definition of this game is : 14) 
v(S) + v(T)::;;; v(S U T) VSCN (4) 
9) The cost function C(q) is the same as the one defined in Aoki[1997](p.18). 
10) See Owen[ 1995](p.213) as to the definition of the characteristic function. 
11) See Aoki[1997](p.77) as to the meaning of this assumption. 
12) See Aoki[1997](p.90). 
13) See Aoki[1997](p.90). 
14) Shapley[ 1971 ](p.12). 
(4) is equivalent to (5).15) This formula gives us the interpretation for a convex game. 
v(S U {i}) - v(S) ~ v(TU {i} ) - veT) ViEN and VSCTCN- {il (5) 
It is clear that (5) means the scale of economy. We will examine the case where there is 
some cost saving from the joint acquisition of the service. 
2. Preliminary: Cooperative Game Solutins 
We will use various cooperative game solutions in the later sections. It is convenient to 
define these solutions(the imputation, the core, the bargaining set, the kernel, and the 
nucleolus) here for our analysis. 
2.1. The Imputation and the Core 
Let x = (XI, X2, "', xn) be a vector denoting the allocated benefit to players. We define 
the imputation as : 
Definition 1: Imputation 16) 
X i 2 V(U}) ViEN 
x(N) = v(N) 
(6) 
(7) 
It is clear that (7) represents Pareto Optimality. As (7) is equivalent to a(N) = C(q(N)) 
from(2), (7) means that all cost is allocated to players. (7) is equivalent to ai < C(q). 
Hence, it means that the allocated cost to each player ai is less or equal to_the individual 
cost C(q) which is the cost when player i gets the service individually. 
If an allocation scheme proposes a solution that does not belong to the imputation, it is 
easy to conceive that player will obtain its service seperately. Players will not cooperate to 
get the service jointly in this case. Therefore, we regard imputation as the minimum 
requirement for the acceptance of the allocation. We do not mention the imputation directly 
in the later but the imputation is significant because the core, the bargaining set, the kernel, 
and the nucleolus are defined as the subset of the imputation. 
15) Shapley[1971](p.13). 
16) See Owen[1995](p.214). 
17) See Owen[1995](pp.218-219). 
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Core is defined as : 
Definition 2: Core 17) 
xes) ;;:::: v(s) 
x(N) = v(N) 
VSCN (8) 
(9) 
(9) is the same as (7). (8) is equivalent to a(S) ~ C(q(S)) by (2). (8) is the extension of(6) 
in the sense that the conditions of individual players are extended to the conditions of 
coalitions. (9) means that the allocated cost to coalition S is less or equal to the cost C(q(S)), 
which is the amount when the players in coalition S obtain the service jointly. Therefore, 
coalition S will not accept the allocation that does not satisfy the core condition. We can 
regard the core condition as the requirement for the coalition's acceptance of the allocation. 
2.2. The Bargaining Set 
It is necessary to define the coalition structure before we define the bargaining set. The 
coalition structure fJ is a partition of the player set N. Namely, 
fJ = [Bl, B2, ... ,Bm] 
where BpnBq = 0(p f:. q) and Bl UB2U ... UBm = N 
As the cost function is concave in our model, the minimum cost of the service is 
achieved when the coalition structure fJ ={ {N} } is formed. We focus on the allocation of 
C(q(N)) in our analysis, so we examine the case where the grand coalition is formed. 
Some players may propose the coalition structures apart from the grand coalition in the 
bargaining processes. Players always make such proposal to receive favorable allocation. 
But the coalition structure other than the grand coalition will not be formed if the 
negotiation is not broken down. Because the minimum cost of the service is C(q(N)). 
The bargaining set is defined as the objection and the counter-objection. The objection 
and the counter-objection are the bargaining rules specifying the bargaining set. The 
definition of the objection is : 
Definition 3: Objection 18) 
Let x be an imputation in a game (N; v) for a coalition structure fJ . Let k and l be two 
distinct players in a coalition B of fJ . An objection of k against l at x is a pair (C;y), 
satisfying: 
18) Maschler[ 19921(p.596). 
(i) CCN, kEC, iEC; 
(ii) y E R C , y(C) = v(C); 
(iii) Yi >Xi , ViE C. 
We consider the objection of player k against player l. This objection will succeed if 
player k can propose the formation of coalition C without player l and can offer the 
allocation assuring that all the members in coalition C can receive more than Xi . 
Furthermore, the proposal of player k must be feasible, namely, the new proposal must 
satisfy y(C) = v(C).The definition of the counter objection is: 
Definition 4: Counter-objection I9 ) 
Let (C;y) be an objection of k against l at X ,x E X( /3), k, l E B E /3 . A counter-
objection to this objection is a pair (D;z), satisfying: 
(i) DCN, lED, kED; 
(ii) z E RD, zeD) = zeD); 
(iii) Zi~Yi' ViEDnc; 
(iv) Zi~xi' ViED-C. 
The counter-objection is a rational opinion against the objection. We explain the 
rationality of the counter-objection as follows. 
Player l proposes coalition D without player k. Player I offers the amount more than or 
equal to the proposal of player k to the members who belong to coalition C and coalition D. 
Player l also offers the amount more than or equal to the original proposal x to the members 
who belong to coalition D and do not belong to coalition C. Player l's proposal must be 
feasible in order for its proposal to be effective, namely, zeD) = v(D). If player k knows 
that player l proposed the counter-objection against player k 's objection, player k will not 
propose the objection against the original allocation x. 
We can define the bargaining set using the objection and the counter-objection. 
Definition 5 : BargainingSet20 ) 
Let (N;v) be a cooperative game with side payments. The bargaining set Mi l ( /3) for 
19) Maschler[ 19921(p.596). 
20) Maschler[ 19921(p.559). 
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a coalition structure {J is 
M~({J) := {xEX({J) : every objection at x can be cantered} 
:= {x E X({J) : there exists no justified objection at x} (10) 
The first equation of the above definition says that some counter-objections will be 
proposed certainly even if a player proposes an objection at the original proposal because 
this player does not satisfy the original proposal. The second equation of (10) says that no 
player can propose rational objections at the original proposal. 
If an allocation is in the bargaining set, the allocation is stable in the above sense. We 
can interpret the bargaining set as the bargaining rule of the formulation of the objection 
and the counter-objection. 
2.3. The Kernel 
It is necessary to define the excess and the surplus before defining the kernel. The excess 
is defined as : 
Definition 6: Excess21 ) 
Let x be an imputation in a game (N;v) for an arbitrary coalition structure. The excess 
e(S,x) of a coalition S at x is v(S) - xeS) if S=t0 , and 0 if S = 0 . 
We can regard the excess e(S,x) as the dissatisfaction of coalition S with the allocation x. 
For example, consider the case where the value of the excess e(S,x) is positive. While 
coalition S can obtain v(S) by itself, the allocated amount to this coalition is xeS) in this 
case, which is smaller than v(S). It is natural that the dissatisfaction becomes bigger as 
e(S,x) increases. 
We can give the excess e(S,x) another interpretation. Namely, the excess e(S,x) is the loss 
of coalition S when coalition S does not accept the allocation x. Consider the case where the 
value of the excess is negative, and we can understand this interpretation concretely. The 
definition of the surplus is : 
Definition 7: Surplus22 ) 
Let x be an imputation in a game (N;v). Let k and l be two distinct players in N. The 
21) Maschler[ 19921(p.596). 
22) Maschler[ 1992l(p.603). 
surplus of k against 1 at x is : 
Sk 1:= max e(S, x) 
. kES./~S (II) 
We consider the meaning of the surplus Sk/X) in terms of the bargaining between player 
k and player I. Player k refers to the coalitions consisting of player k and the players other 
than player 1 in the bargaining processes. We call this collection of coalitions coalitions 
Dk,l' Player k looks for the coalition in which the allocation to player k is the most 
unfavorable in Dk,I. This coalition gives player k the value of sk,I(x) : for example, consider 
the case where sk,I(x) is positive. As this coalition receives no more than v(S), player k does 
not satisfy the allocation x and player k thinks that player 1 receives too much. Player k will 
insist that player 1 should transfer some amount to player k. The surplus Sk/X) gives player 
k the upper limit of its demand to player I. If player k demands more than Sk/X), player k 
cannot show any rational reason to player l because this request means that player k 
receives more than v(S). 
Next, consider the case where sk,I(x) is negative. The excess e(S,x) is the opportunity loss 
of coalition S if coalition S does not accept allocation x. Therefore, we can regard the 
surplus Sk/X) as the minimum opportunity loss of coalition S. Player k will not demand 
more than sk,I(x) in the bargaining with player I. It should be noted that sk,I(x) is the 
minimum opportunity loss because the validity of player k IS proposal is lost if its proposal 
is based on the maximum opportunity loss in the bargaining processes. We can define the 
kernel using the surplus. 
Definition 8:Kernel and Prekernel23 ) 
Let (N; v) be a game and /3 be a coalition structure. The kernel K( /3 ) for ( /3 ) is 
K(/3):= {xEK(/3): sk,I(x) >Sk/X) ~ XI = dUD, all k, IEBE/3, k =f l} (12) 
The prekernel PK ( /3 ) for /3 is 
PK(!3) := {xE)(J(/3) : sk,I(x) = sl.k(x), all k, IEBE/3, k 1-l} (13) 
Suppose that x is the kernel and consider the case where the surplus of k against I at x is 
larger than the surplus of I against k at x, namely, Sk,l(X) > SI'/X). Player k may think that 
player k can demand some amount to player l in this case. But player k cannot make any 
proposal to player I because player I recei ves no more than v( { l}) and player I cannot give 
23) Maschler[ 19921(p.603). 
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player k any more. It is clear that player k demands nothing to player l if the condition (12) 
is satisfied. Theallocation in the kernel is in equilibrium in this case 
The condition (12) is equivalent to : 
K([3):= {xEK([3): XI >v({l}), some k, lEBE[3, k =J l => sk,l(x) :S:;S/,k(X)} (14) 
Player k cannot demand anything from player l even if player l receives more than v( {l} ) 
in this case. Because the surplus of k against l at X is not more than the surplus of l against k 
at x. In other words, the amount of dissatisfaction of playe k is smaller than that of player l. 
The kernel gives players an equilibrium point in the above sense. 
It is clear from the definition of the prekernel that the surplus for every pair (k,l;k =1= l) is 
equal. Therefore the prekernel is in equilibrium. The implication of the prekernel is easy to 
understand intuitively compared with the kernel. This is the advantage point of the 
prekernel. 
We can get the conclusion that the kernel and the prekernel is the formulation of the 
equilibrium of the surplus (the measure of dissatisfaction or the opportunity loss) in the 
bargaining. We will explain the relationship between the kernel and the prekernel in the 
convex game in the next section. 
2.4. The Nucleolus 
We have to define the vector () (x)( E R2fl) to define the nucleolus. 
(15) 
The order of elements of () (x) is in decreasing order. Namely, if i <j, e(Si,x) ~ e(Sj,x). 
We explain the operator -i , which compares any two terms using the lexicographic order. 
() (x) -i () (y) means that there exists some positive integer q such that ()i(X)= ()/y) for i<q 
and ()q(x) < ()q(y).24) We can define the nucleolus as : 
Definition 9: Nucleolus 25) 
Let X be an arbitrary nonempty closed set in Rfl. The nucleolus of X - denoted Nu(X), 
or Nu(N;v;X) - is the set of vectors in X whose () IS are lexicographically least; i.e., 
Nu(x) := {xEX: e (x):::j e (y), all yEX} 
24) We can define :::j as not r- . 
25) Maschler[ 19921(p.611). 
If x = X( {N}), the nucleolus is called the nucleolus of the game. If X = X( fJ), it is called 
the nucleolus of the game for the coalition structure fJ . 
The purpose of this article is to examine the property of the nucleolus in common cost 
allocation. So, we will show some significant implications of the nucleolus in the later 
section. We describe the intuitive interpretation of the nucleolus here. 
We can easily find from the definition of the nucleolus that the nucleolus gives us the 
vector in which the maximum excess is minimized. Therefore, if we regard the excess as 
the dissatisfaction measure, we can regard the nucleolus as the formulation of the 
bargaining process in which maximum dissatisfaction is minimized. 26) 
3. Convex Game and its Implications 
We investigate the meanings of the nucleolus based on the results obtained in the field of 
game theory. We summarize the relationship between the cooperative game solutions 
defined in the previous section. 
It is clear from the definition that the core is a subset of the imputation. Generally 
speaking, it is not true that the core always exists in any kind of game. But it is a well-
known fact that the core exists in a convex game. 27 ) Therefore, we can proceed our 
discussion supposing the existence of the core. It is clear that there exists an imputation in 
our model. We examine the subset of the imputation in the later analysis. 
It is desirable to propose a core solution if the core exists.28) Consider the allocation that 
does not belong to the core, and we can understand this reason. Players will form the 
coalition other than the grand coalition if the allocation is not in the core. As a result, the 
coalition structure other than { {N} } is formed. This situation is not desirable because the 
cost of the service is not minimized. 
We explain the relationship between the core and the nucleolus here. Generally speaking, 
the nucleolus is included in the core if the core exists. 29 ) The nucleolus is one point 
solution.30) Considering these points, the nucleolus is useful to select one point from the 
26) See Maschler[ 1992](p.611) as to the intuitive interpretation of the nucleolus and the difficulties of the 
lexicographic order comparison. Hamlen et aU 1977](p.622) points out that the nucleolus allocation is 
similar to "Justice" in Rawls[ 19711. 
27) See Shapley[1971](p.21). 
28) Hamlen et aU 1977] evaluates four allocation schemes (Shapley value, nucleolus, activity level, and 
Moriarity) in terms of the core. 
29) See Maschler[ 1979](p.335). Strictly speaking, the nucleolus is included in £ - core, which is the exten-
sion of the core. As the core always exists in a convex game, the nucleolus is included in the core in 
our analysis. 




We notice the well-known results about the bargaining set, the kernel, and the nucleolus. 
(16) 
We can interpret the above relationship as the bargaining process in common cost 
allocation. We describe the bargaining processes based on (16) generally as follows. 
Step 1: Players propose some allocation based on the rule of the objection and the 
counter-objection. Players obtain alternative solutions in the bargaining set. 
Step 2: Players select some allocations out of the solutions in Step 1 (the bargaining 
set) using the bargaining rule of the equilibrium of dissatisfaction. Players get 
the allocation in the kernel or the prekernel. 
Step 3: Players obtain the unique allocation by the bargaining rule in which the 
maximum dissatisfaction is minimized. This final result is in the nucleolus. 
The bargaining set coincides with the core in a convex game,31) therefore, the relationship 
(16) means (17) in our model. 
Coree v):::) K(/3):::) Nu(X)32) (17) 
The relationship (17) tells us that we can specify one point from the range of the core 
through the bargaining processes described above. 
The kernel coincides with the prekernel in a convex game.33 ) This fact suggests that (13) 
is not only the definition of the prekernel but also the definition of the kernel in our model. 
This gives us an easier interpretation of the kernel in the bargaining process. 
The prekemel coincides with the nucleolus in a convex game.34) In our model, we can 
interpret nucleolus in terms of the bargaining rule in which the dissatisfaction with the 
allocation is in equilibrium. Such interpretation gives us a more intuitive interpretation than 
the lexicographic order. 
31) Maschler et ai.[ 1971l(p.92). 
32) Core(v) is the core of the game v. 
33) Maschler et ai.[19711(p.83). 
34) Maschler et aI.[19711(p.91). 
4. Bargaining Process in Common Cost Allocation 
4.l. Numerical Example 
We will examine the meanings of the nucleolus in common cost allocation using the 
departments using the common service.3S ) We consider the case N={ J,2,3} here. 
We consider the following piece-wise linear cost function. 36) 
I 40q C(q) = 20q + 300 10q+600 0::;; q < 15 15::;; q < 30 30::;; q 
q is the demand of the service. It is clear that the marginal cost of the service decreases 
as the demand of the service increases. So C(q) is a concave function. We depict C(q) as 
Figure 1 . 
Cost C(q) 
o 
Figure 1 : Cost Function q 
qi is player i IS demand of the service. Suppose that ql=10, q2=15, and q3=25. We can 
estimate the cost of the service for coalition S( eN). 
C( { 1 }) = 400, C( {2}) = 600, C( {3}) = 800 
C( { 1,2}) = 800, C( { 1,3}) = 950, C( {2,3}) = 1,000 
C( { 1,2,3 }) = 1,100 
We can calculate the characteristic function of our game using (1). 
35) It is well-known that the kernel coincides with the nucleolus in a three-person game. We should use the 
example where players are more than three to make our discussion general. But the kernel and the 
nucleolus are the same in a convex game. Therefore. it is sufficient to refer to a three-person game 
example in our model. The results obtained here are applied into n -person case. 
36) The results of our analysis are applied to the case where the cost function of the service is concave. 
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v( {l }) = 0, v( {2}) = 0, v( {3 }) = 0 
v( { 1,2}) = 200, v( { 1,3}) = 250, v( {2,3}) = 400 
v ( { 1 ,2,3 }) = 700 
We will examine the implications of the nucleolus in common cost allocation using the 
above characteristic function. 
4.2. Implications of Imputation and Core in Common Cost Allocation 
As the game defined above is O-normalized, the set of the imputation is described as: 
Xi~O YiEN 
x\+x2+x3 = 700 
The set of the imputation is the triangle area in 3-dimensional space. Because the hyper-
plane XI + X2 + X3 = 700 is bounded by Xi ~ OCi =1,2,3). We can depict the imputation set as 
Figure 2. 
Figure 2 : Imputation 
The core of our game is : 
Xi~O ViEN 
X I+X2 ~ 200 
x I+x3 ~ 250 
x2+x3 ~ 400 
xI+x2+x3 = 700 
We can depict the core as a polygon(ABCDEF) in Figure 3. 
v({l,2}) 
v({3}) 
Figure 3 : Core 
The triangle area in Figure 3 corresponds to the triangle area in Figure 2. So we can 
represent the core in two-dimensional space in a three-person game. 
4.3. The Bargaining Set and the Core in Common Cost Allocation 
We examine the meanings of the bargaining set in terms of the core. For example, the 
allocation xl= (310,190,200), which is depicted in Figure 3, is proposed in the bargaining 
for allocating common cost. It is clear that xlis not in the core. Hence, xl does not belong to 
the bargaining set. 
Player 2 and player 3 are not satisfied with Xl because they receive less that v( { 1,2 D. 
They may form coalition { 1,2}. Player 2 will propose the objection against player 1. 
Namely, player 2 forms coalition {2,3} and offers Y2 = 195 and Y3 = 205. 37 ) 
37) Player 3 can also propose the same objection against player 1.There is no need that \'2= 195 and 
\',=205. Any objection satisfying .\'2> 190, -,",>200, and -'"2+-",=400 is relevant to this case. 
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It is easy to check that the proposal of player 2 satisfies the conditions of the objection in 
Definition 3. 
When player 2 proposes this objection against player 1, player 1 cannot propose an)' 
rational cO!:Lnter-objection against player 2. Player 1 cannot offer a proposal z in which ZI > 
210 and Z3 > 205 because v( {1,3}) = 250. This example says that the players who receive 
an unfavorable allocation can propose the rational objection in the bargaining processes. 
The coalition structure f3 I = { { 1 } , {2,3 } } may be formed in the above example. Because 
players cannot propose any counter-objection, the objection proposed by player 2 is 
admitted. The resulting allocation is not desirable as a firm. For example, consider the case 
where there are some external vendors providing the service. The coalition structure f3 I = 
{ { 1 } , {2,3 } } means that player 1 gets the service externally and coalition {2,3} obtains the 
internal service.38 ) The resulting cost allocation is a = (400,405,595). It is clear that a(N) 
is more than C(N).39) Namely, the minimum cost of the service is not achieved in this case. 
Next, suppose that the allocation x 2 = (100,250,350) is proposed in the bargaining 
process (See Figure 3). It is clear that x2 is in the core of our game. Hence, x2 belongs to the 
bargaining set. x2 is a stable allocation in the sense that no player can propose any rational 
objections. 
The analysis here says that the allocation in the bargaining set is useful as an initial 
proposal in the bargaining process. Because some suboptimal coalition may be formed if 
the allocation that is not in the bargaining set is proposed. 
The property of our model, i.e., the bargaining set coincides with the core, is 
advantageous when we select an initial proposal. It is difficult to specify the range of the 
bargaining set in general but we can easily check whether an allocation is in the core or not. 
In our model, selecting the core allocation is equivalent to selecting the allocation in the 
bargaining set. We can specify the allocation in the bargaining set without complexity in 
our model. 
The analysis here also suggests that another bargaining rule is necessary to allocate 
common cost in a more satisfactory manner. For example, consider that the allocation x3 = 
(100,100,500) is proposed (See Figure 3). It is clear that x3 is the core allocation. As x3 is in 
the bargaining set, no player can object to this allocation. But player 1 and player 2 
receives no more than v( { 1,2} ) = 200 in this allocation. It does not seem that player 1 and 
player 2 are satisfied with x3. If we confine the bargaining rule to the objection and the 
counter-objection, we cannot deny the possibility in which x3 is accepted in the bargaining 
processes. 
38) There is no problem to suppose that player 1 obtains the internal service and coalition {2,3} gets the 
external service in this context. 
39) a(N)= I ,400 and C(N)= I, 100. 
4.4. The Kernel and the Nucleolus in Common Cost Allocation 
Suppose that the allocation x2 = (100,250,350) is proposed to examine the meanings of the 
kernel. It is clear that x2 is in the bargaining set. We calculate the excess of a coalition S at 
x2 using Definition 4. 
e( { 1 }, x2) = - 100 
e({ I,2}, x2) = - 150 
e( { 2 }, x 2) = - 250 
e( { 1,3 }, x2) = - 200 
e( { 1,2,3 }, x 2) = 0 
e( {3 }, x2) = - 350 
e( {2,3 }, x2) = - 200 
Consider the bargaining between player 1 and player 3. They calculate s] :/x2) and 
s3,] (x2), which are defined in Definition 7. 
S],3(X2) = max {e({ I}, x2), e({ I,2}, x2)} =-100 
s3,] (x2) = max {e( {3 }, x2), e( {2,3}, x2)} = - 200 
sl,3(x2) is the minimum loss of player 1 when player 1 does not accept the allocation x2 
and forms a coalition without player 3. We can interpret s3,] (x2) in the same manner as 
s] ,,(x2). The opportunity loss of player 1 is smaller than that of player 3 when they do not 
accept the allocation x 2. 
This result shows that player 1 keeps a more advantageous position than player 3 in the 
bargaining process. Therefore, player 1 may demand to transfer some amount to player 3. 
But it is not rational to demand the difference between sl,3(x2) and S3,](X2) ,i.e., sl,3(x2)-
S3,](X2) because, if player 1 demands this amount to player 3, sl,3(x2) = - 200 and S3,](X2) 
= - 100. It is clear that player 3 demands a transfer of some amount to player 1 conversely. 
It is rational that player 1 demands the half of S l,3(x2) - s3,] (x2) to player 3 if player 1 
demands this amount, S l,3(x2) = s3,] (x2). Hence, player 3 does not demand anything to 
player 1. 
Player 1 IS demand to player 3 is 50 in this example. If player 3 accepts this proposal, the 
new allocation X4 = (I50,250,300) is proposed (See Figure 3). We calculate the excess 
e(S,x4) of this new proposal. 
e( { 1 }, X 4) = - 150 
e( { 1,2 } , x 4) = - 200 
e( { 2 }, X 4) = - 250 
e( { 1,3 }, x 4) = - 200 
e({ I,2,3}, x4 ) = 0 
We obtain S],3(X4) and S3,] (X4) as follows. 
e( {3}, x4 ) = - 300 
e({2,3}'x4) =-150 
S],3(X4) = max {e({ I}, x4), e({ 1,2}, x4)} =-150 
S3,](X4) = max {e({3}, x4), e({2,3}, x4)} =-150 
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As s1,3(x4) = S3,1(X4), the surplus of player 1 against player 3 at x4 is equal to the surplus 
of player 3 against player 1 at x4. There is no room for bargaining between player 1 and 
player 3 . 
Next, we consider the bargaining between player 1 and player 2. As s1,2(x4) = S2,1(X4) = 
- 150, the surplus between player 1 and player 2 is the same. Player 1 demands nothing of 
player 2, and vice versa. As S2,3(X4) = S3,2(X4) = - 200, the surplus between player 2 and 
player 3 is also identical. 
As sk,l(x4) = Sl,k(x4) holds for all the possible pair (k,l;k =1= L), x4 = (150,250,300) is the 
prekernel of our game. This game is a convex game, so x4 is the kernel. The numerical 
example shows that the kernel (prekernel) is useful to select single allocation from the 
bargaining set in our model. The bargaining process is specified by the equilibrium of the 
dissatisfaction with the allocation. 
The kernel is not a point in general. We can see this from the definition of the kernel but 
the kernel is the same as the nucleolus in our allocation model, which is a convex game. 
Therefore, x4 is the nucleolus of our game.We compare x2 with X4 to consider the meanings 
of the nucleolus. x2 and x4 is in the bargaining set but x2 is not the kernel and x4 is the 
kernel. 
We compute () (x2) and () (x4) using (I5). 
B (x2) = (0, - 100, - 150, - 200, - 200, - 250, - 350) 
B (x4 ) = (0, - 150, - 150, - 200, - 200, - 250, - 300) 
We compare () (x2) and () (x4) in lexicographic order. As ()1(x2) = ()1(x4) and ()2(x2) > () 2(x4), 
() (x4) :j () (x2). The relationship () (y) -l () (X4) always holds for any imputation y because 
x4 is the nucleolus. We examine this point in the bargaining process. 
The excess e(S,x) is the dissatisfaction with the allocation x. So the dissatisfaction with x 
is ordered in decreasing order in () (x). The maximum dissatisfaction is minimized as much 
as possible in the bargaining process. 
For example, the coalition that has the biggest dissatisfaction with x2 is { 1 } .40) The 
initial purpose of the bargaining is to minimize player 1 's dissatisfaction with x2. The 
bargaining continues until the lexicographic minimum vector is obtained. The results is the 
nucleolus. 
The nucleolus and the kernel are same in our model. It means that we can proceed the 
bargaining for allocating common cost with the bargaining rule of the kernel (prekernel). In 
40) The first element of {}(x2) is eCN,x2)=0, As x 2 and X4 are in the core, all the elements of (}(x) is not 
positive. We can neglect e(N,x2) and e(N,x4) in the lexicographic order comparison. 
our model, we can give the nucleolus two meanings in the bargaining processes.Namely, 
they are the equilibrium of the dissatisfaction and minimizing the maximal dissatisfaction. 
Conel usions 
We treat the case where there are services that are used in common by divisions or 
departments and the cost function of the service is concave. The scale of economy works in 
this case and users can save cost by the joint utilization of the service. 
We notice the fact that the nucleolus is the subset of the kernel and the kernel is the 
subset of the bargaining set in our analysis. We investigate the meaning of the nucleolus in 
the bargaining processes based on this fact. 
We proceed our analysis based on the model proposed in Aoki[ 1997]. It says that the 
common cost allocation setting is formulated as a convex game if the cost function of the 
service is concave. Furthermore, we notice the following properties of a convex game. 
• The core coincides with the bargaining set in a convex game. 
• The kernel coincides with the nucleolus in a convex game. 
• The prekernel is the same as the kernel in a convex game. 
The numerical example in Section 4 shows that the bargaining set is desirable as the 
initial proposal in the bargaining processes. Generally, the core is the subset of the 
bargaining set and it is difficult to specify its range but we can obtain the range of the core 
easily. The analysis of this article says that we can use the core allocation as an initial 
proposal in the bargaining processes. 
If the players of the game use the equilibrium of the dissatisfaction as the rule of the 
bargaining, the resulting solution is the kernel. It also means that this result is the nucleolus in our 
model. As the nucleolus is the realization of minimizing the maximum dissatisfaction, players 
may accept nucleolus as an allocation scheme. 
If the players of the game agree with the bargaining rule mentioned in this article, which 
are the objection and the counter-objection, the equilibrium of the dissatisfaction, and the 
minimization of the maximum dissatisfaction, players do not need to actually bargain for 
their allocation. We can use the nucleolus as the final allocation. Therefore, the nucleolus is 
a promising proxy solution to the bargaining processes. 
We can easily obtain the nucleolus by solving a series of linear programming problems.41 ) 
So, the nucleolus is desirable in terms of the applicability to practice. 
41) See Kohlberg[ 1972l. 
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We have described the desirable properties of the nucleolus in the above discussion. But, 
we have to solve two problems to apply the nucleolus to common cost allocation. 
First, we should examine the excess in detail. We have shown that the excess is the 
measure of the dissatisfaction but there may be other measures of dissatisfaction from the 
stand point of the user~ of the service. There are many studies about this topic. We can 
apply the results of these investigations to our model.42 ) 
Second, we do not make a normative approach to the nucleolus in common cost 
allocation. We describe the properties of the nucleolus in common cost allocation. Namely, 
our approach is descriptive. We refer to Shapley value, which is a familiar cooperative 
game solution, to explain this clearly. 
It is well-known that Shapley value is derived from a set of axioms and these axioms are 
the necessary and sufficient conditions for Shapley value. Hence, the acceptance of 
Shapley axioms is equivalent to the acceptance of Shapley value. Many researchers have 
interpreted Shapley value axioms in common cost allocation in the past.43 ) 
Recently, some game theorists propose a set of axioms specifying the nucleolus.44) If we 
interpret these axioms in common cost allocation properly, we can give the nucleolus as an 
allocation scheme significant meaning. 
As the discussion of these problems is not the purpose of this article, we have not 
examined these problems here. We will explore these two problems in another paper. 
Received: July 10,1996 
42) Aoki[19881 surveys the various nucleolus and examines the implications of these in common cost 
allocation. 
43) See Aoki[ 1996a1 as to the past studies in which Shapley value is applied to common cost allocation. 
44) See Potters[ 19911, Snijders[ 19951, and Sobolev[ 19951. 
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